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1. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
2. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 1015.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 08/833,892 (filed Apr. 10, 1997).  Claim 1
read: 
  A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a 
commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: (a) initiating a series 
of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said commod-
1
The Elusive “Marketplace” in Post-Bilski 
Jurisprudence 
ANDREW CHIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappos1 appears to 
have provided inadequate guidance to the courts and the Patent Office re-
garding the scope of the abstract-ideas exclusion from patentable subject 
matter.  Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, however, appears to 
have found in that decision a clear vindication of his own view that the ma-
chine-or-transformation test is incorrectly grounded in “the age of iron and 
steel at a time of subatomic particles and terabytes,”2 and thus fails, for ex-
ample, to accommodate advances in “software [that] transform[] our lives 
without physical anchors.”3  Chief Judge Rader has subsequently authored 
a series of opinions identifying the “marketplace” as an operational context 
in which a claimed invention is not likely to be unpatentably abstract.
4
  
This Article argues that this reliance on the  “marketplace” is untenable and 
should form no part of patent-eligibility doctrine. 
I. PROLOGUE: BILSKI
Bilski was an easy case that made bad—or at least unclear—law.  In 
1997, Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw (Bilski) applied for a patent on a 
method for making a market for the sale of a commodity, such as natural 
gas, in which buyers and sellers desired to manage risks relating to fluctua-
tions in the quantity consumed.
5
  Prior art energy trading methods focused 
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on managing risks relating to price volatility.
6
  Despite the apparent com-
mercial value of Bilski’s method,7 Bilski’s patent claims met with stiff op-
position.  Of the twenty-six Supreme Court, Federal Circuit and administra-
tive patent judges who considered Bilski’s application, all but one found 
the claims to be directed to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101.
8
  The judges divided more sharply, however, in their reasoning.  Ma-
jorities of the Federal Circuit and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences held that a patentable process must either be tied to a particular ma-
chine or transform an article,
9
 and found Bilski’s claims to fail both prongs
of this “machine-or-transformation” test.10  Four Supreme Court justices
(including Justice Stevens) and three Federal Circuit judges opined that
methods of doing business should be held nonstatutory
11—at least those
that do not involve manufactures, machines or compositions of matter.
12
A five-justice Supreme Court majority, however, held that neither a 
mandatory “machine-or-transformation” test nor the so-called “business 
ity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon 
historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said con-
sumer; (b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-
risk position to said consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between 
said commodity provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such 
that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said 
series of consumer transactions. 
Id. 
6. See id.
7. See Validity of Software Patents Goes on Trial Today at Supreme Court, USA
TODAY, Nov. 9, 2009, at 7B (reporting that Bilski’s company, Weatherwise USA, offers en-
ergy-billing services that can “lock in energy prices, even during an unusually cold winter”). 
8. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 997 (Newman, J., dissenting) (finding Bilski’s claimed
process to be “neither a fundamental truth nor an abstraction”). 
9. See id. at 954 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (“A claimed process is surely
patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus; or (2) it 
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”); Ex parte Bilski, 2006 WL 
5738364, at *18 (holding that a claim that does not recite a specific apparatus may be di-
rected to patentable subject matter “if there is a transformation of physical subject matter 
from one state into another . . .”); see also id. at *14 (“It is possible that a non-machine-
implemented method may be nonstatutory subject matter if it does not perform a transfor-
mation of physical subject matter even though it contains physical steps that might prevent 
i[t] from being labeled an ‘abstract idea.’”). 
10. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 (finding “the machine implementation part of the
test” inapplicable to Bilski’s claims); id. at 963 (holding that Bilski’s claims do not trans-
form any article to a different state or thing); Ex parte Bilski, 2006 WL 5738364, at *2 (not-
ing that Bilski’s claims are “non-machine-implemented”); id. at *1820 (holding that none 
of Bilski’s claims involve a physical transformation). 
11. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
12. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 974 (Dyk, J., concurring).
2
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method” exclusion was warranted by precedent13 or necessary to invalidate 
Bilski’s claims as directed to an unpatentable abstract idea.14  In its invalid-
ity ruling, the Court merely cited its precedents and the statutory text with-
out explaining their application to the claims,
15
 thereby shedding little light 
on the question of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea.
16
  In clos-
ing, the Court expressly invited the Federal Circuit to develop “other limit-
ing criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not incon-
sistent with its text.”17  Chief Judge Rader’s subsequent elaboration of the 
abstract-ideas doctrine explicitly referenced and responded to this invita-
tion.
18
 
II. CHIEF JUDGE RADER ON INVENTIONS IN THE “MARKETPLACE”
A. Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
In December 2010, in the Federal Circuit’s first post-Bilski opinion
addressing the scope of the abstract-ideas exclusion, Chief Judge Rader in-
troduced the notion that the “marketplace” can guide courts in the patent-
eligibility analysis.  In Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp.,
19
 the plaintiff asserted claims from a parent patent and various con-
tinuation patents
20
 relating to, inter alia, methods for the halftoning of digi-
tal images.  Digital halftoning is a technique that allows computer displays 
and printers to approximate an image with fewer colors or shades of gray 
13. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (“The ‘machine-or-transformation’ test is not the sole test
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”); id. at 3228 (“Section 101 
similarly precludes the broad contention that the term ‘process’ categorically excludes busi-
ness methods.”). 
14. Id. at 3231 (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would preempt use of this
approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”). 
15. Id.  The Court noted,
The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the unpatent-
ability of abstract ideas.  The Court, therefore, need not define further what consti-
tutes a patentable ‘process,’ beyond pointing to the definition of that term provid-
ed in § 100(b) and looking to the guideposts in Benson, Flook and Diehr.
Id. 
16. Id. at 3236 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 3231 (majority opinion).
18. See Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2010). 
19. Id.
20. See id. at 865 (describing the lineage of the six patents asserted in the case).
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than the original.
21
  The most common basic approach to digital halftoning 
uses a “mask,” also known as a “threshold array,” to translate colors and 
shades on a pixel-by-pixel basis from the original image to the processed 
image.
22
  The claimed methods used a type of mask with aesthetically de-
sirable mathematical properties called a “blue noise mask,” and the patent 
disclosures taught improved computer algorithms for constructing such 
blue noise masks.
23
 
In a summary judgment decision issued while the In re Bilski ma-
chine-or-transformation test was still controlling, the district court held 
three of these process claims to be invalid as directed to abstract ideas.
24
  
Claim 1 of the parent patent was representative of these claims: 
 A method for the halftoning of gray scale images by utilizing a pixel-
by-pixel comparison of the image against a blue noise mask in which the 
blue noise mask is comprised of a random non-deterministic, non-white 
noise single valued function which is designed to produce visually pleasing 
dot profiles when thresholded at any level of said gray scale images.
25
According to the district court, “pixel-by-pixel comparison does not require 
a particular machine, nor does the assembly of gray scale images to gener-
ate final dot profiles mandate a further visual display or image, which 
would meet the transformation requirement.”26 
In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit noted the Supreme 
Court’s refusal in Bilski “to provide a rigid formula or definition for ab-
stractness.”27  Accordingly, Chief Judge Rader wrote: 
[T]his court also will not presume to define “abstract” beyond the recogni-
tion that this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly
as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and
the statutory context that directs primary attention on the patentability crite-
ria of the rest of the Patent Act.
28
21. Id. at 863; see also ROBERT ULICHNEY, DIGITAL HALFTONING 1 (1987) (“Digital
halftoning . . . refers to any algorithmic process which creates the illusion of continuous-
tone images from the judicious arrangement of binary picture elements.”). 
22. RESEARCH CORP. TECHNOLOGIES, BLUE NOISE MASK: PREMIER STOCHASTIC
IMAGING TECHNOLOGY 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.rctech.com/resources/downloads/BNM/ 
BlueNoiseMask.pdf. 
23. See U.S. Patent No. 5,111,310 (filed Dec. 4, 1990) (issued May 5, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter ‘310 patent]. 
24. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV-01-658-TUC-RCJ, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71883 at *52 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2009). 
25. ‘310 patent, supra note 23, at cl. 1.
26. Research Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71883 at *30.
27. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (2010).
28. Id.
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From Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Bilski, Chief Judge Rader also 
took from the Court’s opinion a warning that “section 101 eligibility should 
not become a substitute for a patentability analysis related to prior art, ade-
quate disclosure, or the other conditions and requirements of Title 35.”29  
According to Chief Judge Rader, the function of the patentable subject mat-
ter requirement is limited to that of a “coarse eligibility filter,” comple-
mented by the more “powerful” abilities of the enablement and written de-
scription requirements as “tools to weed out claims that may present a 
vague or indefinite disclosure of the invention.”30 
Consistent with this “coarse” approach, the Federal Circuit’s analysis 
of the abstract-ideas exclusion in Research Corp. did not address the lan-
guage of the claims in issue, but focused instead on two aspects of what the 
court took to be the claimed invention.  First, Chief Judge Rader pointed to 
concrete features of the invention’s operational context, including physical 
elements recited in unasserted claims and the “marketplace” in which the 
invention might be applied: 
 The invention presents functional and palpable applications in the field 
of computer technology.  These inventions address “a need in the art for a 
method of and apparatus for the halftone rendering of gray scale images in 
which a digital data processor is utilized in a simple and precise manner to 
accomplish the halftone rendering.”  ‘310 patent col.3 ll.33-40.  The fact 
that some claims in the ‘310 and ‘228 patents require a “high contrast 
film,” “a film printer,” “a memory,” and “printer and display devices” also 
confirm this court’s holding that the invention is not abstract.  Indeed, this 
court notes that inventions with specific applications or improvements to 
technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they 
override the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.
31
Second, Chief Judge Rader stressed the importance of reading each 
claim as a whole, rather than “to dissect the claims into old and new ele-
ments and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.”32  
Thus, the court found that the claims in issue were not directed to an ab-
stract “mathematical formula,” but to “‘a process of’ halftoning in comput-
er applications” or “aspects and applications” thereof.33  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s invalidation of the asserted 
claims.
34
 
29. Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3238 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
30. Id. at 869.
31. Id. at 86869.
32. Id. at 869 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
668 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:663 
In using the phrase “not likely to be so abstract” rather than “not so 
abstract,” Chief Judge Rader left open the question of precisely how con-
siderations of the “marketplace” are to bear on the abstract-ideas analysis.  
One possible reading is that such considerations are superfluous, in that the 
Research Corp. holding is “confirm[ed]” by the court’s observation about 
the “marketplace,” but in no way relies upon it.  A different Federal Circuit 
panel recently suggested such an interpretation in commenting on Chief 
Judge Rader’s consideration of the film, printer, memory and display de-
vices recited in the unasserted dependent claims in Research Corp.
35
 
A recent district court decision, however, treated Chief Judge Rader’s 
“marketplace” language as a “standard” by which a process can be found to 
be patentably “specific and concrete.”  In Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys “R” 
Us, Inc.,
36
 Glory asserted claims directed to “processes involving the ex-
traction of information entered into and stored in a document or file and the 
formatting and transmission of that information to an application pro-
gram.”37  Toys “R” Us moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were di-
rected to unpatentable abstract ideas.
38
  At oral argument, Glory cited the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Research Corp. for the proposition that “func-
tional and palpable applications in the field of computer technology” were 
not unpatentably abstract.
39
  Although the district court rejected Glory’s ar-
gument as untimely,
40
 it proceeded to find the Research Corp. claims “far 
more specific and concrete than those at issue in the instant action.”41  Spe-
cifically, the court found, “While the Federal Circuit noted that ‘inventions 
with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the market-
place are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory lan-
35. See Fuzzysharp Techs., Inc. v. 3DLabs Inc., 447 Fed. App’x 182 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4,
2011) (per curiam).  The court in Fuzzysharp noted that: 
There is no basis for looking to other claims except to the extent that they inform 
the meaning of the challenged claims through claim differentiation.  [Patentee] ar-
gues that this court looked to elements recited in unasserted claims in [Research 
Corporation].  In fact, however, the court in that case concluded that the asserted 
claims were patent-eligible without looking to unasserted claims and then simply 
noted that elements recited in unasserted claims “confirm this court’s holding that 
the invention is not abstract. 
Id. at 185 (citing Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 859). 
36. Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., No. 09-4252, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51888 (D.N.J. May 16, 2011). 
37. Id. at *11 (citing U.S. Patents Nos. 6,683,697; 7,075,673; & 7,672,007).
38. Id. at *1, *4.
39. Id. at *14–15 & n.8.
40. Id. at *14 (concluding that Glory’s failure to cite factors beyond the “machine or
transformation” test in its opposition brief effectively “waived any argument” that the court 
should consider such factors). 
41. Id. at *1416 & n.8.
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guage and framework of the Patent Act,’ that standard is simply not met by 
the Glory Patents.”42 
The Glory court’s bare conclusion that “that standard is simply not 
met” is notably lacking in doctrinal guidance.  If Research Corp.’s “mar-
ketplace” considerations are to be recognized as a standard in the patenta-
bility analysis of claims, courts will need to clarify the form and substance 
of the inquiry.  As a review of two subsequent Federal Circuit decisions 
will show, judicial pronouncements on the “marketplace” thus far have 
been unilluminating. 
B. Classen
The Federal Circuit’s divided panel opinion in Classen Immunothera-
pies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC
43
 highlights a significant ambiguity in Chief 
Judge Rader’s formulation of the “marketplace” inquiry.  In Classen, the 
patentee asserted process claims purportedly covering the act of reviewing 
the scientific literature relating to risks of developing a chronic immune-
mediated disorder.
44
  Some of the claims recited a further step of immuniz-
ing a patient in accordance with the schedule that appears from the relevant 
literature to have the lowest risk.
45
  The defendants moved for summary 
judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the claims were directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.
46
  The district court granted the motion, holding 
that each of the claims in issue was directed to an unpatentable abstract 
idea.
47
  The Federal Circuit’s initial decision affirmed under the machine-
or-transformation test, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the 
decision after Bilski v. Kappos.
48
 
In a decision authored by Judge Pauline Newman and joined by Chief 
Judge Rader, the majority found that the claims that included the “physi-
cal” immunization step were “directed to a specific, tangible application, as 
in Research Corporation,” and therefore satisfied “the coarse eligibility fil-
ter of § 101.”49  In contrast, the claims lacking this physical step did not put 
“knowledge to practical use,” and were therefore ineligible as “directed to 
the abstract principle that variation in immunization schedules may have 
consequences for certain diseases.”50 
42. Id.
43. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
44. Id. at 1061.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1062.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 106263.
49. Id. at 1066.
50. Id. at 1067.
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Judge Kimberly Moore dissented, stating that she would have af-
firmed the district court in holding all of the asserted claims to be directed 
to unpatentable abstract ideas.
51
  She specifically challenged the notion that 
“marketplace” considerations could distinguish Classen’s claimed physical 
immunization processes from Bernard Bilski’s processes for facilitating the 
offering of “fixed bill” energy contracts52 or Dale Flook’s methods for de-
tecting abnormal conditions in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons.
53
  
As Judge Moore wrote: 
In reaching its conclusion that the [physical immunization] patent claims 
are directed to patent eligible subject matter, the majority relies heavily on 
Research Corp. . . . .  Research Corp. explains that claims “are not likely to 
be so abstract that they” recite nonstatutory subject matter if they are di-
rected to “inventions with specific applications or improvements to tech-
nologies in the marketplace.”  In my view, the claimed inventions in Bilski 
and Flook have specific applications to the marketplace, but those claims 
nonetheless recite nonstatutory subject matter under § 101.
54
At the heart of the disagreement between Judge Moore and the majori-
ty is a syntactic ambiguity in Chief Judge Rader’s statement that “inven-
tions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the 
marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory 
language and framework of the Patent Act.”55  In Judge Moore’s reading, 
the qualifier “in the marketplace” applies over both sides of the disjunctive 
“or.”  Since the unpatentable Bilski and Flook inventions satisfy the test as 
“inventions with specific applications in the marketplace,” Judge Moore 
finds the test insufficient to assure patent-eligibility:
56
 
51. Id. at 1076 (Moore, J., dissenting).
52. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3233 (2010).
53. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 58586 (1978).
54. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1081 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
55. Research Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir.
2010). 
56. Classen, 659 F.3d at 108081 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Nor do I understand the test
the majority proposes for determining patentability under § 101.”). 
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In contrast, the relevant finding in the majority’s analysis is simply 
that the physical immunization method claims were “directed to a specific, 
tangible application,” without reference to any “marketplace” in which the 
claimed methods might be applied.
57
  According to this parsing of Chief 
Judge Rader’s statement in Research Corp., the qualifier “in the market-
place” applies only to the immediately preceding phrase “improvements to 
technologies.” 
The discrepancy between the two syntactic approaches implicates the sub-
stantive question of where to look for indicia of specificity.  Judge Moore 
looks to the marketplace, and finds Bilski’s and Flook’s claimed methods 
being applied in indisputably commercial settings.
58
  The majority, howev-
er, being unconstrained by the “marketplace” qualifier, looks to tangibility, 
and finds the physical act of immunization sufficient to move at least some 
of Classen’s claimed subject matter “from abstract scientific principle to 
specific application.”59  Despite the majority’s apparently heavy reliance on 
Research Corp.,
60
 “marketplace” considerations end up having no bearing 
on the outcome of the case. 
C. Ultramercial v. Hulu
Unlike Research Corp.’s claims, the process claims in issue in Ultra-
mercial v. Hulu expressly recited sequences of steps in a market transac-
tion, providing the best opportunity yet for Chief Judge Rader to clarify the 
respective roles of claim elements and the “marketplace” in his analysis.61  
The market in question is a familiar one to every couch potato: advertisers 
sponsor the viewing of a TV show by paying a broadcaster to insert the ad-
vertiser’s message into the show’s broadcast.  Ultramercial’s invention 
provides the necessary software for an Internet broadcaster to perform var-
ious functions in its analogous dealings with content providers, advertisers 
and viewers. 
57. Id. at 1066 (majority opinion).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 5254.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 4950.
60. See Classen, 659 F.3d at 1081 (Moore, J., dissenting).
61. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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In Ultramercial, the patentee asserted claims reciting such steps as 
“providing said media products for sale on an Internet website” and “re-
stricting general public access to said media product.”62  The defendants 
moved to dismiss for lack of patentable subject matter.
63
  Having stayed the 
case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski, the district court is-
sued a decision promptly thereafter, applying both the Federal Circuit’s 
machine-or-transformation test and the Supreme Court’s more holistic 
preemption analysis. 
In applying the former test, the district court noted that the claims re-
cited the “Internet,”64 and that “the only useful application of Plaintiff’s in-
vention is with relation to the Internet, where the facilitator is a specifically 
‘programmed computer.’”65  The court reasoned, however, that “the Inter-
62. Representative claim 1 of the patent reads:
A method for distribution of products over the Internet via a facilitator, said
method comprising the steps of: a first step of receiving, from a content provider, 
media products that are covered by intellectual-property rights protection and are 
available for purchase, wherein each said media product being comprised of at 
least one of text data, music data, and video data; a second step of selecting a 
sponsor message to be associated with the media product, said sponsor message 
being selected from a plurality of sponsor messages, said second step including 
accessing an activity log to verify that the total number of times which the sponsor 
message has been previously presented is less than the number of transaction cy-
cles contracted by the sponsor of the sponsor message; a third step of providing 
the media product for sale at an Internet website; a fourth step of restricting gen-
eral public access to said media product; a fifth step of offering to a consumer ac-
cess to the media product without charge to the consumer on the precondition that 
the consumer views the sponsor message; a sixth step of receiving from the con-
sumer a request to view the sponsor message, wherein the consumer submits said 
request in response to being offered access to the media product; a seventh step of, 
in response to receiving the request from the consumer, facilitating the display of 
a sponsor message to the consumer; an eighth step of, if the sponsor message is 
not an interactive message, allowing said consumer access to said media product 
after said step of facilitating the display of said sponsor message; a ninth step of, if 
the sponsor message is an interactive message, presenting at least one query to the 
consumer and allowing said consumer access to said media product after receiving 
a response to said at least one query; a tenth step of recording the transaction 
event to the activity log, said tenth step including updating the total number of 
times the sponsor message has been presented; and an eleventh step of receiving 
payment from the sponsor of the sponsor message displayed. 
U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (issued Mar. 18, 2008). 
63. Ultramercial v. Hulu, LLC, No. 09-06918, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93453 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 13, 2010), rev’d, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
64. Id. at *910.
65. Id. at *13.
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net is not a machine,”66 and the fact “[t]hat the disclosed invention is only 
used on computers or computer networks cannot alone satisfy the machine 
test without rendering the test completely toothless.”67  Accordingly, the 
court concluded that the claimed process neither was “tied to a particular 
machine” nor “transform[ed] an article.”68 
The court proceeded to perform a holistic comparison between Ultra-
mercial and Bilski, finding that the “core principle” of Ultramercial’s patent 
was “the basic idea that one can use advertisement as an exchange or cur-
rency,” an abstract idea “similar to the core of the Bilski patent.”69  The 
court also reasoned that Ultramercial’s patent was made no less abstract by 
the use of the Internet, a facilitator, passwords and activity logs; as in Bil-
ski, “the patent still discloses an abstract idea garnished with accessories.”70  
In light of these similarities, the court concluded that the patent did not 
cover patentable subject matter and granted Hulu’s motion to dismiss.71 
The Federal Circuit’s panel decision on appeal,72 authored by Chief 
Judge Rader, recapitulated and extended the Research Corp. opinion’s dis-
cussion of the abstract-ideas exclusion.  Chief Judge Rader reiterated that 
the patentable subject matter requirement is “no more than a ‘coarse eligi-
bility filter’”73 and that unpatentable abstractness “should exhibit itself so 
manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject 
matter and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the patent-
ability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”74  He then went on to provide a 
new gloss on the Supreme Court’s abstract-ideas jurisprudence in Benson,75 
Flook
76
 and Diehr,
77
 reasoning that “the Patent Act covers and protects any 
new and useful technical advance, including applied ideas.”78  Accordingly, 
the court undertook to “focus[] its inquiry on the abstractness of the subject 
matter claimed” by Ultramercial.79 
66. Id. at *10 (citing Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068
(N.D. Cal. 2009)) (“[T]he Internet is an abstraction.”). 
67. Id. at *13.
68. Id. at *616.
69. Id. at *17.
70. Id. at *18.
71. Id. at *1920.
72. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
73. Id. at 1326 (quoting Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
74. Id. at 1327.
75. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
76. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
77. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
78. Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1327.
79. Id. at 1328.
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To frame its abstractness inquiry, the court returned to Research 
Corp.’s characterization of “inventions with specific applications or im-
provements to technologies in the marketplace.”80  The court found that Ul-
tramercial’s invention: 
[S]eeks to remedy problems with prior art banner advertising, such as de-
clining click-through rates, by introducing a method of product distribution
that forces consumers to view and possibly even interact with advertise-
ments before permitting access to the desired media product.  By its terms,
the claimed invention purports to improve existing technology in the mar-
ketplace.
81
The Federal Circuit acknowledged the district court’s finding that “the 
mere idea that advertising can be used as a form of currency is abstract, just 
as the vague, unapplied concept of hedging proved patent-ineligible in Bil-
ski,” but went on to point out that many of Ultramercial’s claim limitations 
“are likely to require intricate and complex computer programming” and 
“clearly require specific application to the Internet and a cyber-market en-
vironment.”82  For example, the third step of claim 1 recites “providing said 
media products for sale on an Internet website,” and the fourth step recites 
“restricting general public access to the media products.”83 
Having noted these facts, the court concluded that it “simply [found] 
the claims here to be patent-eligible, in part because of these factors.”84  In 
so doing, it expressly declined to hold that “programming complexity” or 
“use of an Internet website to practice . . . a [computer-implemented] meth-
od” is necessary or sufficient to satisfy § 101.85  Chief Judge Rader’s opin-
ion, however, did not cite any other facts about the claimed invention in 
support of the court’s patent-eligibility finding.86  The Federal Circuit’s de-
80. Id. at 1328 (quoting Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[I]nventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies 
in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language 
and framework of the Patent Act.”)). 
81. Id. (citation omitted).
82. Id.
83. See supra note 62.
84. Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1328 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. The only facts about Ultramercial’s invention discussed in the remainder of the
opinion are that it “does not specify a particular mechanism for delivering media content to 
the consumer,” and that the claims require, inter alia, “controlled interaction with a con-
sumer via an Internet website . . . .”  Id. at 132930.  The court cited the former not in sup-
port of its patent-eligibility finding, but in pointing out that many overbreadth concerns can 
be addressed by the requirements of § 112.  Id. at 1329.  The latter fact is merely a para-
phrase of the same claim limitations discussed earlier, and is cited only in response to the 
suggestion that Ultramercial’s invention falls under the mental-steps exclusion, a subcatego-
ry of the abstract-ideas exclusion.  Id. at 132930. 
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termination that Ultramercial’s invention is not unpatentably abstract thus 
appears to rest heavily, if not exclusively, on the Research Corp. inquiry. 
At first glance, it may appear that Chief Judge Rader’s Ultramercial 
analysis read the qualifier “in the marketplace” into both prongs of the Re-
search Corp. inquiry, as Judge Moore did in Classen:
87
 
With respect to the first prong, Chief Judge Rader in Ultramercial pointed 
out claim limitations that “clearly require specific application to the Inter-
net and a cyber-market environment.”88  Addressing the second prong, he 
specifically found that “the claimed invention purports to improve existing 
technology in the marketplace.”89  The marketplace is thus cited in each 
finding as a context that fixes the characterization of the invention at a pa-
tentably concrete level of abstraction.
90
 
Even so, it is difficult to attach doctrinal weight to Ultramercial’s 
“marketplace” considerations, at least if Chief Judge Rader intends to 
maintain his determination that the Bilski claims were unpatentably ab-
stract.
91
  As Judge Moore’s Classen dissent pointed out, Bilski’s claimed 
processes also have specific applications to the marketplace.
92
  Moreover, 
the calculations outlined in Bilski’s patent specification are at least as likely 
as Ultramercial’s methods to require intricate and complex computer pro-
gramming.
93
  Bilski’s claimed methods of market-making in fixed-price 
commodity contracts, however, need not be performed in connection with 
the Internet.
94
  Chief Judge Rader’s analysis of the first prong must there-
fore be understood as turning on the claimed process’s applicability not to 
markets in general, but to an Internet-facilitated “cyber-market.”  It is a 
87. See supra text accompanying note 56.
88. Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1328.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
92. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1081 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
93. See Joint Appendix at A-81 to A-87, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(No. 07-1130), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/2007-
1130bilski_joint_appendix.pdf (providing a detailed description of the invention). 
94. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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technological—not an economic—characteristic of the claimed invention 
that confers patentable concreteness here. 
The Bilski machine-or-transformation inquiry is capable of drawing 
this distinction, independent of “marketplace” considerations, as long as the 
Internet is understood as a “particular machine.”  Despite the latent ambi-
guity in this inquiry
95
 and the frequent characterization of the Internet itself 
as an abstraction,
96
 there is strong support for finding Internet-mediated 
transactions such as those described in Ultramercial’s process claims to be 
“tied to a particular machine.”  As its capitalization suggests, the Internet is 
a proper noun signifying that it is a particular entity; i.e., “the global inter-
network of TCP/IP networks that we all know and use.”97  While no specif-
ic physical component of the Internet is necessary to its existence,
98
 the In-
ternet’s root name servers provide an identity criterion for the Internet,99 at 
least under a causal theory of reference.
100
  Namely, the Internet known and 
used by all of us is the internetwork that uses thirteen specified root name 
servers (i.e., {A–M}.root-servers.net)101 to support its Domain Name Sys-
tem (DNS).
102
  Even though the root name servers are physically and geo-
95. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 994 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that in the majority’s
“machine-or-transformation” test, “[w]e aren’t told when, or if, software instructions im-
plemented on a general purpose computer are deemed ‘tied’ to a ‘particular machine’”). 
96. See, e.g., Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1077
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Yet the Internet is an abstraction. . . . One can touch a computer or a 
network cable, but one cannot touch ‘the [I]nternet.’”); DOUGLAS E. COMER, COMPUTER
NETWORKS AND INTERNETS 345 (5th ed. 2009) (“The chief difference between the Internet 
and a physical network is that the Internet is an abstraction imagined by its designers and 
created entirely by protocol software.”). 
97. CHARLES M. KOZIEROK, THE TCP/IP GUIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE, ILLUSTRATED
INTERNET PROTOCOLS REFERENCE 30 (2005) (“The generic noun internet is a short form for 
the word internetwork, while the proper noun Internet refers to the global internetwork of 
TCP/IP networks that we all know and use.”). 
98. See generally BARRIE SOSINSKY, NETWORKING BIBLE 456 (2009) (“The Internet was
designed to be a highly redundant mesh structure that could survive any outages to a sub-
stantial portion of the network and still be operable.”). 
99. See BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC., A COMPANION TO METAPHYSICS 330 (Jaegwon
Kim et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (defining the criterion of identity). 
100. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980); 2 HILARY PUTNAM, The
Meaning of “Meaning,” in MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 215 
(1975). 
101. See ROOT SERVER TECHNICAL OPERATIONS ASS’N (Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.root-
servers.org (providing current status information on the group of thirteen named root name 
servers). 
102. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE:
THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM AND INTERNET NAVIGATION 80–86 (2005) (describing the in-
volvement of the root name server in the resolution of DNS queries); WILLIAM STALLINGS, 
DATA AND COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS 774 (8th ed. 2007) (describing the DNS as “essen-
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graphically disparate,
103
 a global convergence on specifications for their 
functionalities has provided a detailed basis for the identification and use of 
the Internet in practice.
104
  Because of these functional specifications, root 
name servers should be recognized as specific technologies supporting In-
ternet-mediated causal interactions and meaningfully limiting the scope of 
Internet-mediated processes.
105
  Accordingly, processes requiring use of the 
Internet’s DNS (and, therefore, use of the root name servers) should be 
found to be “tied to a particular machine.” 
Compared with the “machine-or-transformation” inquiry, Chief Judge 
Rader’s analysis of the second prong, consisting solely of the finding that 
“the claimed invention purports to improve existing technology in the mar-
ketplace,”106 is less informative, and ultimately provides no analytical basis 
for distinguishing Bilski’s claimed improvements to commodity market-
making processes
107
 from “improvements to technologies in the market-
place.”  As discussed in Section III, it is difficult to attribute any economic 
meaning to the phrase “improvements to technologies in the marketplace” 
that does not encompass Bilski’s processes.  Ultramercial’s “marketplace” 
considerations can therefore enter into patent law’s abstract-ideas doctrine, 
if at all, only through technological indicia that closely resemble the post-
Bilski machine-or-transformation “clue.” 
tial to the functioning of the Internet”); Markus Müller, Who Owns the Internet?  Ownership 
as a Legal Basis for American Control of the Internet, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 709, 713–19 (2005) (describing the importance of the root file to the operation of 
the DNS and the infeasibility of any alternative). 
103. Hardware and software implementations of the Internet’s thirteen root name servers
may vary widely, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 102, at 
102 (“There is no standard hardware and software implementation of the root name serv-
ers.”), and may incorporate multiple physical systems in locations throughout the world. 
See id. at 101–03 (describing the use of “satellite sites at different locations” to implement 
root servers). 
 104. See generally DNS RFCs, INTERNET SYS. CONSORTIUM, 
http://www.isc.org/community/reference/RFCs/DNS (last visited May. 27, 2012) (compiling 
specifications and standards for DNS protocols). 
105. See Aaron Sloman, Evolution of Mind as a Feat of Computer Systems Engineering:
Lessons from Decades of Development of Self-Monitoring Virtual Machinery 7 (Jul. 16, 
2011), Draft presented at the Pierre Duhem Conference (July 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/sloman-sps-2011.pdf (listing “name-
servers” among the computer technologies that “support[] the causal interactions” between 
computer systems and their external environments). 
106. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). 
107. See supra Part I.
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III. THE “MARKETPLACE” RECONSIDERED
The abstract concept “marketplace” can embrace a variety of econom-
ic activities within the recognized concerns of patent law.  Here, we de-
scribe two possible approaches to characterizing claimed inventions as 
“improvements to technologies in the marketplace” in the context of these 
activities and concerns.  The first emphasizes the marketplace as a site of 
production; the second focuses on competition in the marketplace. 
A. Endogenous Growth Theory and Market Production
The production economics literature has usually represented the no-
tion of improvements to technologies as upward shifts in the production 
frontier;
108
 i.e., the curve representing the maximum output attainable from 
each level of inputs.
109
  Quantitatively, the technical relationship between 
inputs and outputs takes the form of a production function: e.g., the func-
tion f in the equation q = f(x) in which q represents output and x is a vector 
of inputs.
110
 
In his influential theory of endogenous growth,
111
 economist Paul 
Romer departs from this approach by regarding the state of technology as 
an input to the production function, rather than the production function it-
self.  Specifically, Romer described “the design for a new good” as a non-
rival input, in that “[o]nce the design is created, it can be used as often as 
desired, in as many productive activities as desired.”112  Thus, Romer uses 
the form F(A,X) to represent a production process that depends on rival in-
puts X and nonrival inputs A,
113
 wherein A may include product designs.
114
  
Romer assumes that all inputs to F are productive and that replication of 
the production process is possible; i.e., F(A,λX) = λF(A,X).115 
Romer’s theory has been celebrated for its representation of market 
incentives that drive technological change.
116
  A critical observation under-
lying Romer’s model is that while “[t]he vast majority of designs result 
108. See TIMOTHY J. COELLI ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO EFFICIENCY AND
PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 4 (2d ed. 2005). 
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 12 & n.2.
111. See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71
(1990). 
112. Id. at S74.
113. Id. at S76.
114. See id. at S74.
115. See id. at S76.
116. See, e.g., LEWIS-GUODO LIU & ROBERT PREMUS, GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH:
THEORIES, RESEARCH, STUDIES, AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1950–1997, at 2 (2000) 
(describing Romer’s work as “pioneering”). 
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from the research and development activities of private, profit-maximizing 
firms,”117 a price-taking producer could not afford to pay anything for the 
nonrival inputs A.
118
  Romer’s solution is to introduce market power explic-
itly in the form of patents,
119
 so that intentional, private investments in de-
veloping designs can be compensated out of quasi rents.
120
 
Romer’s endogenous growth model can thus be interpreted as an eco-
nomic justification for the patent-eligibility of improvements to technolo-
gies in the marketplace.  Under this interpretation, an invention should be 
found patent-eligible if it is a nonrival input to a replicable process that also 
has rival inputs. 
Such a rule, however, does not provide a basis for distinguishing be-
tween Bilski and Ultramercial.  In each of these cases, the inputs to the 
claimed process are the parties to the recited transaction.  The inputs are 
rivalrous (assuming each party’s demand for such transactions is fixed), 
and the process is replicable (assuming the potential market for such trans-
actions is sufficiently large).  Endogenous growth theory therefore does not 
appear to provide an economic criterion for patentably concrete “improve-
ments to technologies in the marketplace.” 
B. Trade Secret Law and Market Competition
At the heart of trade secret law is a notion akin to “improvement to
technologies in the marketplace.”  The definition of trade secret requires 
that the subject matter “derive[] independent economic value, actual or po-
tential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertain-
able by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use.”121  If it can be assumed that the relevant “mar-
ketplace” includes all persons who could obtain economic value from a 
claimed invention’s disclosure or use and that “improvements to technolo-
gies” provide independent economic value to those with special 
knowledge, then trade secret law could supply the necessary analytical un-
derpinnings for Chief Judge Rader’s considerations.  In effect, a claimed 
invention would be recognized as a patentably concrete “improvement to 
technologies in the marketplace” if it could have been the subject of a trade 
secret. 
117. See Romer, supra note 111, at S74.
118. See id. at S76 (“If all inputs were paid their value marginal product, the firm would
suffer losses.”). 
119. See id. at S81 (“Once a firm has produced a design for durable i, it can obtain an
infinitely lived patent on that design.”). 
120. See id. at S77–S78.
121. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/utsa85.pdf. 
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Unfortunately, such an approach is at odds with the complementary 
relationship between patent and trade secret law, which relies in large part 
on the distinction between economically valuable knowledge and patenta-
ble inventions.
122
  The category of trade secrets includes such proprietary 
information as business plans, customer lists, and “negative know-how” 
(e.g., disadvantageous approaches to a problem), none of which have yet 
been recognized as patentable subject matter.
123
  Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court has declined to find that federal patent law preempts the field occu-
pied by state trade secret law.
124
 
A further difficulty in relying on the definition of a trade secret as a 
gloss for Chief Judge Rader’s “marketplace” considerations is that the trade 
secret inquiry requires fact-finding as to the information “generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other per-
sons.”125  The fact that Chief Judge Rader did not consult sources beyond 
the patent document in considering the “marketplaces” in Research Corp. 
and Ultramercial suggests that he looked to the “Background of the Inven-
tion” section of the patent document as a description of the state of the pri-
or art.  However, the background section is a poor proxy for trade secret 
law’s “general knowledge” inquiry, because it is often drafted with a view 
to limiting disclosure rather than providing a comprehensive account of 
generally known information.
126
  Like endogenous growth theory,
127
 trade 
secret law does not appear to supply a suitable analytical framework for de-
termining whether a claimed invention constitutes an “improvement to 
technologies in the marketplace.” 
122. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) (“Trade secret law
will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the in-
dependent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention.  Com-
petition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite patenta-
ble, invention.”). 
123. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 331 & nn.78–79 (2008). 
124. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484–85.
125. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i).
126. See Robert A. Migliorini, The Dedication to the Public Doctrine and Lessons for
Patent Practitioners, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 825, 840 (2005) (advising attor-
neys to “limit[] the background of the invention section to the problems encountered with 
the current state of the art” and to “avoid disclosing subject matter that is not claimed, but 
that could be potentially utilized with the invention”). 
127. See supra Part III.A.
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IV. EPILOGUE: MAYO
The Supreme Court did not intend for Bilski to be the last word on pa-
tentable subject matter,
128
 and less than two years passed before the Court 
issued its next major decision in the area: Mayo v. Prometheus.
129
  Mayo 
presents the Federal Circuit with fresh challenges as it endeavors to devel-
op a coherent and practicable patentable subject matter doctrine that is con-
sistent with Bilski and other Supreme Court precedents.
130
  The greatest dis-
ruption will likely be caused by the Mayo Court’s reductionist approach to 
the claims at issue,
131
 which is at least in tension with the longstanding re-
quirement that § 101 eligibility inquiries must be addressed to patent claims 
“considered as a whole.”132  But Mayo can also be read as putting to rest 
any notion that the specification of a “marketplace” as the operational con-
text for a claimed invention is relevant to the abstract-ideas doctrine. 
Each claim at issue in Mayo recited 
(1) an “administering” step—instructing a doctor to administer the drug to
his patient—(2) a “determining” step—telling the doctor to measure the re-
sulting metabolite levels in the patient’s blood—and (3) a “wherein” step—
describing the metabolite concentrations above which there is a likelihood
of harmful side-effects and below which it is likely that the drug dosage is
ineffective, and informing the doctor that metabolite concentrations above
or below these thresholds “indicate a need” to decrease or increase (respec-
tively) the drug dosage.
133
The Court found that the “administering” step “simply refers to the relevant 
audience, namely doctors who treat patients with certain diseases with thi-
opurine drugs,” and noted that “doctors used thiopurine drugs to treat pa-
tients suffering from autoimmune disorders long before anyone asserted 
these claims.”134  If the Court had considered the “marketplace” relevant to 
patent-eligibility, its specific finding of an existing market for thiopurine 
drug treatment would immediately have led to the conclusion that the 
claimed invention represented an “improvement to technologies in the 
128. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
129. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
130. In Mayo, the Federal Circuit had already given specific consideration to the case in
light of the Supreme Court’s Bilski decision.  See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collabo-
rative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 (2010).  The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 
Federal Circuit.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305. 
131. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98 (finding that the “administering” and “determin-
ing” steps and “wherein” clause do not add anything “significant” to the law of nature un-
derlying the invention, whether taken separately or in combination). 
132. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
133. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1290–91 (syllabus).
134. Id. at 1297.
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marketplace.”  The Court, however, did not draw such an inference.  In-
stead, it characterized the “administering” step as a mere “attempt[] to limit 
the use of the formula to a particular technological environment,” and 
therefore insufficient to overcome the prohibition against patenting abstract 
ideas.
135
 
CONCLUSION 
Chief Judge Rader’s doctrinal effort to ground patentable concreteness 
in the economic abstraction of the marketplace suffers from syntactic am-
biguity, does not explain the outcome of any case, evades economic inter-
pretation, and has now been at least sidestepped by the Supreme Court.  It 
is time to put whatever is left of the “marketplace” doctrine to rest. 
135. Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010)).
